

S-E-C-R-E-T

IAC-M-76

2 July 1952

25X1

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Minutes of Meeting held in Director's
Conference Room, Administration Building
Central Intelligence Agency, on 2 July 1952

Director of Central Intelligence
General Walter Bedell Smith
Presiding

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. Fisher Howe, acting for Special Assistant, Intelligence,
Department of State
Brigadier General John Weckerling, acting for Assistant Chief
of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army
Rear Admiral R. F. Stout, Director of Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy
Brigadier General John B. Ackerman, acting for Director of
Intelligence, Headquarters, United States Air Force
Dr. Malcolm C. Henderson, acting for Director of Intelligence,
Atomic Energy Commission
Brigadier General Richard C. Partridge, Deputy Director for
Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Mr. Meffert W. Kuhrtz, acting for Assistant to the Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation

ALSO PRESENT

Mr. Loftus E. Becker, Central Intelligence Agency
[redacted] Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Robert Amory, Jr., Central Intelligence Agency
[redacted] Central Intelligence Agency
[redacted] Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. William P. Bundy, Central Intelligence Agency
[redacted] Central Intelligence Agency
[redacted] Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. William C. Trueheart, Department of State
Colonel O. B. Sykes, Department of the Army
Captain Ray Malpass, USN, Department of the Navy
Colonel Edward H. Porter, Department of the Air Force
Colonel Charles F. Gillis, Department of the Air Force
Lieut. Colonel C. D. Sullivan, Department of the Air Force
Colonel S. M. Lansing, The Joint Staff

[redacted]
Acting Secretary

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Approval of Minutes

1. Action: The minutes of the last meeting, 26 June 1952 (IAC-M-76), were approved.



2. Action: The estimate was approved as modified.

3. Discussion: There was some discussion of the feeling, particularly held by the Air Force, that the estimate presented an overpessimistic view and that some course of action might be found which would minimize the dire consequences that were predicted. It was explained, however, that most of the paper was based on the assumption that all aid had already, in fact, been cut off without any indication or intention that it would be resumed. It was acknowledged that a better estimate, at least in the matter of form, might have been produced if more time had been available.

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